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YOU CAN'T GET HERE FROM HERE: 
TOWARD A MORE CHILD-CENTERED IMMIGRATION LAW 
David B. Thronson • 
INTRODUCTION 
Family is a powerful force that shapes many critical life choices. In 
particular, family plays a central role in decisions about where people 
live. We routinely anticipate that families will live together and are 
rarely surprised to see children living with parents and spouses living 
together. Beyond such traditional nuclear family arrangements are a 
dizzying array of family configurations and choices about who lives in a 
household and who is counted as a family member. Just as families 
often decide to live together, for a host of reasons, many families make 
difficult choices to live separately, often to advance the best interests of 
one or all family members. This commonly involves a parent or parents 
leaving children behind, but this also encompasses children striking out 
on their own. 1 
In general, these critical decisions about where and with whom to 
live are left to families. Families themselves determine who is 
considered family and make decisions about where families and family 
members will locate. As a baseline, government involvement with such 
decisions is limited? In fact, although the word "family" is not found in 
the U.S. Constitution,3 the Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
• Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada Las Vegas; J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Kerry 
Abrams, David Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, Karen Musalo and Veronica 
Thronson for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this work. 
1 See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the 
Transnational Migration a/Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 
269,272 (2000). 
2 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (,,[T]he 
Constitution prevents [the government] from standardizing its children and its 
adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."). 
3 In contrast, many international human rights instruments acknowledge the 
centrality of family explicitly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declares that the "family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State." Article 16(3), Dec. 10, 
1948. See also Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art, 17(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 1969 ("the family 
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the state"); Organization of African of Unity: Banjul Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 18(1); 21 I.L.M. 58, ("The 
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that the protection of private choices about family integrity is a matter of 
constitutional dimension.4 Supreme Court "decisions establish that the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many 
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.,,5 Constraints on 
family decisions about where to live, therefore, are exceptions and not 
the rule. 
Immigration law, by establishing parameters on who is permitted 
within national borders, is squarely among the exceptions. Through 
immigration laws, the government directly and inevitably impacts 
decisions by immigrant families about where and with whom they live, 
sanctioning some choices and prohibiting others. Family decisions and 
immigration law are often in tension. The application of immigration 
law routinely conflicts with private decisions about family composition 
and integrity, and in tum family decisions regarding where to live 
routinely result in the circumvention of immigration provisions. 
At the same time that immigration law mandates the separation of 
many families, the reality that families transcend borders is deeply 
incorporated in immigration law. Family relationships are integral in the 
immigration law framework that delineates who is allowed to enter and 
remain in the United States, and a significant portion of legal 
immigration IS attributable, directly or indirectly, to family 
family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the 
State which shall take care of its physical health and mora1."); Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov 4, 1950, art. 
8,213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 Dec. 1953) ("Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life ... "); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 23(1), U.N.T.S. No. 14668 ("The 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State."); International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), ("The widest possible 
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society ... "). 
4 The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that among the liberties protected 
by the due process clause of the constitution is the right to "establish a home 
and bring up children, ... [a right] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Annette 
Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 683, 688 (2001) ("[T]he u.S. Constitution provides parameters that 
limit the states' abilities to define and regulate family rights and obligations."). 
5 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04. 
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relationships.6 Simply put, much of legal immigration is traceable to a 
close family relationship. 
This does not mean, however, that the converse is true. In other 
words, while many immigrants may attribute their legal status to a 
family connection, the existence of even close family relationships with 
persons permitted to live in the United States does not inevitably or even 
usually provide feasible avenues for legal immigration. This is 
occasionally a surprising revelation. The notion that family ties do not 
provide a certain route to legal immigration status runs counter to 
popular conceptions and representations of immigration law, and an 
understanding of this aspect of immigration law is noticeably absent in 
the rhetoric that attends the public debate regarding immigration reform.7 
Family plays a central role not only in the growth of the authorized 
immigrant population, but also in the growth of the unauthorized 
immigrant population as well. 
The misperception that legal immigration opportunities are readily 
available to immigrants with close family members in the United States 
is widespread. Yet millions of people with close relatives living in the 
United States lack viable options to regularize their immigration status. 
Basic characteristics in immigration law's framework preclude many 
families with close and lasting ties to this country from successfully 
navigating the maze of immigration law. In particular, immigrant 
families that are physically present in this country consistently face dead 
ends as they seek to obtain legal status for all family members. They 
can't get here from here. 
This reality has profound impacts on the daily lives of immigrant 
families in general, and on children in immigrant families in particular. 
A better understanding of the role of family in immigration has 
important and lasting implications for the nation and immediate 
application in the ever ongoing discussion of immigration reform. 
Part I of this article examines the extensive integration of 
immigrants into the broader population of families in the United States. 
Immigrant families are not an isolated and obscure population and the 
6 See discussion, infra at notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
7 See, e.g., President Bush, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, (May 
IS, 2006) http://www/whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0S/printl2006OS IS-
8.html (focusing on perceived tension between border security and worker 
visas). 
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extent of integration is remarkable. The proliferation of mixed status 
families, in which all family members do not share a common 
immigration or citizenship status, makes it virtually impossible to 
conceive of policies that will affect immigrants without also intimately 
affecting a much broader cross section of the national population, 
including millions of U.S. citizen children. 
Part II of this article explores several characteristics of the legal 
framework of immigration that create significant barriers to legal 
immigration for immigrant families living in the United States. In 
particular, this analysis reveals immigration law's systemic devaluation 
of children and the diminishment of their interests, giving rise to a 
narrow, parent-centered conception of family. This section also explores 
how the excruciating complexity of immigration law can mask the ways 
in which seemingly innocuous immigration provisions work together to 
severely curtail immigration options for families in the United States. 
Part III of this article examines the serious social consequences that 
result when families are unable to regularize the immigration status of all 
family members. Not only are immigrants and immigrant families 
marginalized, but citizen children in mixed status families are denied the 
full social benefits of citizenship as a variety of formal and informal 
barriers assimilate them to the status of noncitizen. 
Finally, Part IV of this article discusses motivations for the 
current boundaries of family immigration systems and envisions a more 
child-centered approach. 
I. IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
While much attention is paid to the size of the immigrant population, 
an exploration of the extent of integration of immigrants and immigrant 
families into the overall population of the United States may provide 
better insights into this population and its phenomenal growth. 
Immigrants do not form an isolated population, separate and distinct 
from the broader population. Millions of immigrants, including those 
without legal status, are profoundly woven into the national fabric 
through close family ties with citizens and legal permanent residents. 
The classic image of whole families leaning over a ship railing to 
catch a glimpse of the Statue of Liberty before processing at Ellis Island 
did happen, and its modem equivalent occurs today. But it has always 
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been the case that many immigrant families arrive in the United States 
piecemeal.8 It is common that immigrant families do not arrive together, 
as one or more family members travel ahead and others follow. Other 
immigrants start or increase families after arrival. As a result, there is no 
one model of an "immigrant family" and constantly shifting immigration 
laws affect families in quite diverse ways based, in part, on how and 
when individual family members arrived. One consequence of this is 
that families in the United States frequently contain a wide mix of 
immigration statuses, from undocumented to legal immigrant to citizen. 
Many families benefit from legal provisions that permit certain 
forms of immigration related to family. In fact, the legal framework that 
determines who may immigrate to the United States legally is dominated 
by considerations of family. First, direct family sponsorship is the most 
common route of legal immigration.9 Under family sponsored 
immigration provisions, U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents may 
petition for the immigration of certain family members who fall into 
particular categories. lo Second, spouses and children may qualify as 
"derivatives" to immigrants who are principal beneficiaries of other 
immigration provisions, including employment-based immigration and 
the diversity visa lottery. I I All told, approximately 80% of legal 
8 Included in one of the first federal statutes placing any restrictions on 
immigration was the proviso that "this section shall not be held to exclude 
persons living in the United States from sending for a relative or friend who is 
not of the excluded classes under such regulations as the Secretary of Treasury 
may prescribe." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551. 
9 The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigratiori Services reports that in 2004, 
65.6 percent of legal permanent immigration to the United States was 
accomplished through family-sponsored immigration. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Legal Permanent 
Residents: 2004 at 3 (2005). 
10 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (b )(2)(A)(i) (2006), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (2006). The 
priority given the petition differs based on the immigration and citizenship 
status of the sponsoring petitioner and the relationship between the petitioner 
and the beneficiary. Most petitions face backlogs of many years. See 
discussion infra at notes 53-61 and accompanying text. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
traditional nuclear families fare best under the statutory scheme. See Nora V. 
Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and 
Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 273, 
276 (2003) (detailing how immigration law continues its reliance on 
assumptions based on traditional, nuclear families despite the declining 
prevalence of this model); Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 
Ala. L. Rev. 943, 955-60 (2001); Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and 
Immigration: A Roadmap for the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 Am. 1. Compo L. 
511,528 (1995). 
118 V.S.C.A. § 1153(d) (2006). For example, the spouse and minor children of 
the recipient of an employment-based immigrant visa may qualify to 
accompany the principal immigrant. 
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immigration is attributable to a family relationship.12 Considerations of 
family, therefore, dominate the statutory framework of legal 
immigration. 
This is not at all to say that family is unimportant to those arriving in 
the United States outside the framework of legal immigration. 13 
Between four and five million families living in the United States are 
composed entirely of persons without authorized immigration status. 14 
The majority of these "unauthorized families" have no children, though 
there are approximately 725,000 families with children in the United 
States in which no member, neither children nor parents, holds legal 
immigration status. IS 
This highlights the obvious point that while most undocumented 
immigrants in the United States are adults, a significant number are not. 
Approximately 1.8 million children, some in families and some 
unaccompanied, live in the United States without legal immigration 
authorization. 16 Children thus represent 16% of the entire unauthorized 
population in the United States. 17 
Still, families in which all members have legal immigration status 
and those in which none have legal status are only a small part of the 
picture: 
The casual observer - and policymaker - might readily 
believe that the country is neatly divided into two kinds 
of families: those composed of citizens who have strong 
claims to legal rights and social benefits, and those 
composed of noncitizens, whose claims to both are more 
contingent. American families, however, are far more 
12 Michael Fix, et aI., The Urban Inst., The Integration ofImmigrant Families in 
the United States 7-8 (2001), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immilLintegration.pdf (last visited June 1, 
2005). 
13 In recognition of the unauthorized migration of families, enforcement efforts 
targeted at families traveling together have increased. See Chertoff Says 
Families Crossing Borders Illegally to Be Detained, CAJE Project, available a 
hUp://cajeproject.org/blog/?p=5 ,(March 21,2006). 
14 Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant 
Population in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population 
Survey, at 8 (Pew Hispanic Center, March 7,2006). 
15 ld. 
16 ld. 
17 1d. 
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complex: the number of families that contain a mix of 
both citizens and noncitizens is surprisingly large. 18 
Patterns of immigration and patterns of family formation are 
independently diverse and in combination they frequently result in the 
creation of "mixed status" families, that is families in which all family 
members do not share the same immigration status or citizenship. Such 
families are remarkably widespread - of the entire population of the 
United States, one of every ten children now lives in a mixed status 
family.19 Further, of families with children and headed by a noncitizen, 
eighty-five percent are mixed-status families.z° Fifteen percent of poor 
children live in mixed-status families. 21 
The permutations of immigration status in mixed status families are 
myriad. Mixed status families are composed of "any combination of 
legal immigrants, undocumented immigrants, and naturalized citizens.,,22 
Moreover, the composition of mixed status families "changes frequently, 
as undocumented family members legalize their status and legal 
immigrants naturalize.,,23 Further confusing the situation is the fact that 
the "proliferation of permanent and temporary immigration statuses ... 
creates new and more complicated types of mixed-status families.,,24 
While some permutations are rare, others encompass millions of families 
and children. 
For example one in five children in the United States lives in an 
immigrant family, defined as a family in which one or more parent is an 
immigrant. 25 Most of these, or "15 percent of all children in the [United 
States,] were native born children with immigrant parent(s).,,26 This 
means that the vast "majority of children in what social scientists refer to 
as 'immigrant families' are actually in mixed status families.,,27 This 
segment of the U. S. child population is growing faster than any other. 28 
18 Michael E .. Fix & Wendy Zimmennan, Urban Inst., All Under One Roof 
Mixed-Status Families in an Era of Reform , I (1999). 
19 Fix et aI., supra note 12 at 15. 
20 !d. 
21 Id. at 16. 
22 Fix & Zimmennan, supra note 18 at 1. 
23 Id. 
24Id. at 2. 
25 Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2002. 
26 Valerie Leiter, Jennifer Lutzy McDonald & Heather T. Jacobson, Challenges 
to Children's Independent Citizenship: Immigration, Family and the State, 13 
Childhood 11, 16 (2006) ("[Four] percent of children were foreign-born with at 
least one immigrant parent."). !d. 
27 !d. 
28Id.atl1. 
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Of the 6.6 million families in the United States with a head of the 
family or a spouse who is unauthorized, about one-third have U.S. 
citizen children.29 From a different angle, over three million U.S. citizen 
children in the United States live in approximately two million families 
where at least one parent is not authorized to remain in the country.30 In 
some such families, all the children are U.S. citizens, while in other 
families, siblings do not share a common immigration or citizenship 
status.31 In families where a parent is not authorized to remain in the 
United States, almost two-thirds of all children are U.S. citizens, 
meaning that the remaining one third of children in such families hold no 
legal immigration status or a status short of citizenship. 32 While less 
common, there are some families in the United States in which parents 
have legal immigration status yet their children do not.33 Parents within 
mixed status families also frequently do not share the same immigration 
status. In fact, in 41 % of mixed status families, parents have different 
citizenship statuses. 34 
In sum, differences in family size and composition, together with the 
permutations of undocumented status and a multiplicity of legal 
immigration and citizenship statuses, create confounding variations on 
the theme of "mixed-status" families. This mix creates confusion in 
sorting out societal obligations and treatment of immigrant families, as 
immigrants in the United States are not an isolated and discrete 
population that can be easily culled from the general population. 
Through family, immigrants are thoroughly integrated into the national 
fabric. It is simply not possible to take any action that will affect 
immigrants without also intimately affecting a much broader swathe of 
U.S. society, including many U.S. citizens and certainly including many 
29 Passel, supra note 14. More broadly, one in five children in the United States 
and one in four of low income children in the United States is the child of an 
immigrant. See Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Inst., Lesson of 
Welfare Reform for Immigrant Integration 1 (2002). 
30 Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant 
Population in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population 
Survey, at 8 (Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006). 
31 In 1.5 million families in which the head of the family or a spouse is 
unauthorized, all the children were born in the United States. !d. Nearly half a 
million families in which the head of the family or a spouse is unauthorized 
have both U.S. citizen children and children without authorized immigration 
status.ld. 
32 Id. 
33 Such situations often involve parents who fail, willfully or unwittingly, to 
take appropriate actions to regularize their children's status. As discussed more 
fully below, immigration law is framed with an eye to providing parents holding 
legal immigration status with options to avoid this situation. 
34 Leiter et ai., supra note 28 at 17. 
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children. Removing an undocumented immigrant worker from the 
country has impact that will be felt at home, not just in the workplace. 
Workers occasionally may be fungible, but family members are not. 
As discussed more fully below, the prevalence of a close family 
member with legal immigration or citizenship status does not a guarantee 
that immigrants in mixed status families will achieve legal immigration 
status themselves. Anytime family members do not share the same 
immigration or citizenship status, there is a possibility that immigration 
law will reach disparate conclusions about their right to enter or remain 
in the United States. This means that while some families ultimately 
will converge on a single immigration status or citizenship, others will 
permanently stay in a mixed status, facing a perpetual threat to family 
unity and a variety of everyday challenges. 
II. THE MYTH OF THE LINE 
In contrast to "past generations in which many undocumented 
immigrants gradually moved into legal immigration status or maintained 
a less permanent presence in the United States, today's undocumented 
population is notable for both its lack of prospects for legalization under 
current law and its relative stability.,,35 For most of this country's 
history, immigration laws and policies permitted relatively easy access to 
lawful immigration status.36 While the share of the U.S. population that 
is foreign-born is much lower today than it was in the early 1900s,37 
most foreign-born U.S. residents. in those earlier times either were 
admitted to legal immigration status or at least had prospects of attaining 
it. 38 The specter of illegality did not haunt these earlier generations. 
The importance that is now attached to the "illegality" of a person's 
immigration status is a relatively new phenomenon?9 Current 
35 David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the 
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 Tex. Hisp. 
J.L. & Pol'y 45, 52 (2005). 
36 "The government excluded a mere 1 % of the 25 million immigrants who 
landed at Ellis Island before World War I, mostly for health reasons." Mae M. 
Ngai, How Grandma Got Legal, L.A. Times, May 16, 2006 (noting that the 
"Chinese were the exception, excluded on grounds of 'racial unassimilability"'). 
37Fix, et al. supra note 12 at 9. 
38 Mae M. Ngai, How Grandma Got Legal, L.A. Times, May 16,2006, at B13 
("[C]omparisons between past and present miss a crucial point. There were so 
few restrictions on immigration in the 19th and early 20th centuries that there 
was no such thing as 'illegal immigration. "'). 
39 See generally, Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the 
Making of Modern America (2004). 
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immigration law not only labels many more immigrants "illegal" than in 
the past, but it also imposes numerous barriers that prevent 
undocumented immigrants from achieving legal immigration status 
despite otherwise having eligibility for immigrant visas. 
The nation's history of virtually unfettered immigration undoubtedly 
colors the popular perception that legal immigration status is generally 
available to those who seek it. For example, in popular and political 
treatment of the issue of immigration, it is common to hear variations on 
the notion that any immigration reform should not reward those 
unlawfully present in the United States by permitting them to "cut in 
line.,,40 The clear implication is that a line exists and, while it might take 
longer than in the past, patient prospective immigrants eventually will be 
able to enter the United States legally. Yet the volume of mixed status 
families in the United States alone indicates that there is more at work 
than long lines and impatience. The persistence and growth of the 
undocumented population in mixed status families, undocumented 
despite close family relationships with persons legally in the United 
States, call into question the idea that families are readily able to move 
through the immigration system and obtain legal immigration status for 
all family members. 
Upon closer inspection of the provisions of immigration law, the 
myth of "the line" is dispelled. Under modem immigration law 
significant barriers stand in the way of families which make it difficult or 
even impossible to get here (legally), especially when the family already 
is here (physically). Some of the barriers are fundamental to the 
structure of immigration law. In fact, they are so engrained that they 
often are taken for granted, or viewed as merely a natural state of affairs. 
Other barriers arise in the technical interplay of complex immigration 
statutes. A common aspect, however, is the systemic devaluation of 
children and the diminishment of their interests. 
A. ASYMMETRICAGENCYAND THE DEVALUATION OF 
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS 
Immigration law devalues children most fundamentally by denying 
children agency throughout the principle frameworks of immigration 
law. Certainly, the ubiquitous "best interests of the child" standard that 
governs or influences many decisions affecting children in other arenas 
40 See, e.g., President Bush supra at note 7 (stating that potential beneficiaries of 
immigration reform "will have to wait in line behind those who have played by 
the rules and followed the law"). 
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does not drive immigration law.41 But immigration law goes beyond 
merely ignoring the interests of children. Immigration law is 
systemically and specifically designed to limit the role of children and 
the value placed on their interests. 
1. Definition, Dependency and Devaluation 
By definition in immigration and nationality law, no "child" exists 
except in relation to a parent.42 The statutory definitions of "child" 
require the satisfaction of qualifying conditions, generally the 
demonstration of a particular relationship between a child and a parent, 
such as birth in wedlock, creation of a stepchild relationship, 
"legitimation," or adoption. In discrete ways, the establishment of each 
of the qualifying relationships requires a demonstration of the 
dependency of the child on the parent.43 In contrast, in limited instances 
when immigration law is forced to contemplate children independently 
of parents, it treats them not as "children" but rather haphazardly as 
"juveniles" or "minors.'.44 
Moreover, immigration law reserves to the parent the power to 
recognize and establish a parent-child relationship for immigration 
purposes.45 For example, in the absence of parental action to 
"legitimate" or establish a bona fide relationship with a child, proof of or 
even admission of parentage is insufficient to establish a parent-child 
relationship for immigration purposes.46 Therefore, any immigration 
41 In fact, the notion of the best interests of the child appears in immigration law 
only with respect to special immigrant juveniles, children dependent upon a 
juvenile court for whom family reunification is not a viable option. 8 V.S.C.A. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J) (2006). So foreign to immigration law is the concept of "best 
interests of the child" that in these cases special factual findings with regard to 
the child's interest are made not in immigration proceedings but in a state 
luvenile court. /d. 
2 The Immigration and Nationality Act provides distinct definitions of child for 
statutory provisions relating to immigration and provisions relating to 
nationality. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1)(B) (2006) (defining "child" for 
purposes of immigration provisions) and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(c)(1) (2006) 
(defining "child" for purposes of nationality provisions). The differences, 
though significant in particular cases, are not relevant to this analysis. 
43 For a fuller discussion of how notions of dependency are embedded in the 
immigration law definition of child, see David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? 
Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 
63 Ohio St. L.J. 979, 991-92 (2002). 
44 Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45 Thronson, supra note 43 at 991-92 (describing how immigration law 
"recognizes a 'child' only through parental action"). 
46 In a few instances, state action may establish the prerequisite dependency. 
See, e.g., Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 782, 785 (BIA 1994) (noting that 
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benefit that immigration law makes available on the basis of being a 
"child" necessarily requires parental action. In sum, "[p ]arental 
possession and control are the hallmarks of a parent-child relationship in 
immigration law.',47 
Through this narrow definition of children, immigration law 
establishes children as passive objects and not actors in the immigration 
system.48 This conception of children sets the stage for further 
devaluation of the interests of children. If children are viewed as 
passive, it seems only natural to deny agency to children in immigration 
law and, more broadly, to limit the use of children and their interests as 
organizing forces in family immigration. 
2. Family Immigration and the Parent-Centered Family 
In immigration law, families are conceived around parents, not 
around children. This starts with the parent-controlled definition of 
"child" and continues with the overall framework of family sponsored 
immigration. Parents are the critical players in this framework, and 
children and their interests in family integrity are ignored or relegated to 
the background. This happens because the statutory scheme of 
immigration law, to the extent that it advances family integrity, does so 
only in the narrow sense of creating opportunities for parents to align 
their children's status with their own. Children, on the other hand, are 
denied any agency and opportunity to extend immigration status to their 
parents. A fuller understanding of this requires a brief review of the 
"when the country where a child was born eliminates all legal distinctions 
between legitimate and illegitimate children, all children are deemed to be the 
legitimate offspring of their natural parents from the time that country's laws are 
changed"). In such cases, "state action shifts power away from parents, but not 
toward children." David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering 
Conceptions o/Children 's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 
979, 992 n.84 (2002). 
47 Thronson, supra note 43 at 992. 
48 Immigration law thus adopts an antiquated property-based view of children, a 
conception in children are regarded as "being naturally dependent, belong[ing] 
to the individuals who create them until majority, when they acquire the status 
of independent individuals." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A 
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1811 
(1993). A modern model of children as property "asserts not that children are 
property but that our culture makes assumptions about children deeply 
analogous to those it adopts in thinking about property." Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1042 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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workings of family-sponsored immigration, the source of most legal 
immigration. 
Generally, the statutory framework of immigration law permits citizens 
and legal pennanent residents to petition for family members who fall within 
certain limited categories to be admitted to the United States as legal 
pennanent residents.49 In this scheme, the person having legal immigration 
status is the "petitioner," and the person petitioned for is the principal 
"beneficiary." If this principal beneficiary has a spouse or children, the 
spouse or children may in some instances acquire immigration status as 
"derivatives" of the principal beneficiary.50 
The priority given to the petition depends upon both the immigration 
status of the sponsoring petitioner, as either citizen or legal pennanent 
resident, and the relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary.51 
The law prioritizes petitions of citizens over those of legal pennanent 
residents, and favors the parent-child relationship of traditional nuclear 
families over other family relationships.52 Certain relationships, for instance 
the relationship between a citizen parent and a child, are not subject to 
numerical limitation and provide for the immediate availability of an 
immigrant visa.53 On the other hand, relationships such as that between a 
legal permanent resident parent and a child are subject to annual numerical 
limitations and resulting backlogs that now extend many years.54 Not all 
family relationships are recognized, and the recognized relationship given 
lowest priority by immigration law, the relationship between adult citizens 
and their siblings, includes backlogs that currently extend to more than 
twenty years. 55 
49 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(b )(2)(A)(i) (2006), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (2006). 
50 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153( d) (2006). 
51 See id. 
52 See generally Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value 
Family and Marriage? Immigration Law's Conflicted Answer, 32 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 273 (2003); Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 
943,955-60 (2001); Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap 
for the Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 Am. J. Compo L. 511, 528 (1995); Victor C. 
Romero, Asians, Gay Marriage and Immigration: Family Unification at a 
Crossroads, 15 Ind. Int'l & Compo L. Rev. 337 (2005). 
53 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § I 151(b) (2006). Processing 
times and bureaucratic delays can be extensive - the immediate availability of an 
immigration visa should not be confused with the ability to immigrate immediately. 
54 For example, the August 2006 Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of 
State shows that the government is now processing visas for the spouses and 
minor children of legal permanent residents who applied in September 1999, 
nearly seven years ago. Dep't St. Visa Bull., August, 2006. 
55 See id. 
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In this statutory scheme, the parent-child relationship is favored, but 
only when the parent holds legal immigration status. Both citizen and 
legal permanent resident parents can petition for children. Children, on 
the other hand, may never petition for their parents - citizens ultimately 
may petition for their parents, but only when they reach age 21 and cease 
to be "children" under immigration law.56 
The pattern of preventing immigration status to flow from a child to 
other family members is ubiquitous in immigration law. For example, a 
child cannot include a parent as a derivative if the child obtains legal 
immigration status.57 Further, derivative status extends only one 
generation, so that young parents who otherwise would qualify as 
derivatives cannot even extend immigration status to their own 
children.58 Even more, while adult asylees and refugees can obtain 
derivative status for their spouses and children, child asylees and refugees 
cannot obtain such status for their parents.59 
The framework for family-sponsored and derivative immigration 
thus subordinates children's status to that of their parents. When parents 
are successful in navigating the immigration system, their children may 
benefit. Yet children with legal immigration status cannot reciprocate 
and extend such family based immigration benefits to a parent or other 
family members. The system is geared to assimilate children's status to 
that of their parents, not the other way around.60 This asymmetry is not a 
reflection of the relationship involved - in all of these instances the same 
family relationship may allow an extension of immigration status if the 
legal status holder is the parent, not the child.61 Yet unlike similarly 
56 8 V.S.c.A. § 1151 (b )(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
57 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(d). If, for example, a child immigrates on the basis of a parent-
child relationship with one parent, immigration law does not then permit derivative 
status to extend to this child's other parent or siblings. 
58 8 V.S.C.A. § 1153(d). 
59 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 V.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(3), 1157(c)(2) (2000). 
Similarly, there is no statutory provision for reunification with parents for a child 
granted protection from removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. See 
generally Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification and 
United States Immigration Policy, 78 Temp. L. Rev. 897 (2005). 
60 See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 6 Nev. LJ. 1165 (2006). 
61 See Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere Fortuity" of Birth? Are Children 
Citizens, 15(2) Differences 91, 95 J. Feminist Cultural Stud .. (discussing the 
"striking asymmetry in the family reunification rights of similarly placed adults 
and minor children"). Children also face barriers in other major immigration 
law programs not directly related to family. Children generally cannot apply 
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situated adults, children who hold legal immigration or citizenship status 
simply are not permitted to extend that status to other family members. 
For purposes of immigration law, therefore, families centered on 
parents with status are recognized and valued. The immigration scheme 
values the parents' interests in family integrity and provides for the 
possibility that such parents will choose to attempt to extend legal status 
to their children. But the family immigration provisions of immigration 
law turn a blind eye to families in which only children hold legal 
immigration status. Children's interests in family integrity do not serve 
as a basis for possible extension of immigration status. 
B. THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS - BARRIERS TO LEGAL IMMIGRATION 
STATUS FOR FAMILIES LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES 
As the broad sweep of family immigration devalues children and 
their role in families, the details of immigration law follow suit. 
Immigration law creates barriers to regularizing status in the interplay of 
complex immigration statutes, in ways that often elude meaningful 
public debate because of their technical complexity. Further, as the 
constant evolution of immigration statutes has proceeded, the complexity 
of statutory provisions has only escalated. This pattern of development 
in immigration law masks the real impact of many seemingly innocuous 
statutory provisions and obscures from debate the actual policies that are 
advanced. A prime example of this is found in the limitations placed on 
the availability of "adjustment of status." 
Some immigrants who are present in the United States and otherwise 
meet all substantive qualifications for an immigrant visa are permitted to 
"adjust status" to legal permanent resident.62 This simply means that if 
they otherwise qualify to immigrate legally to the United States, they 
may process their applications for admission as legal permanent 
residents while remaining in the United States rather than traveling to the 
under the diversity visa lottery because applicants must be high school 
graduates or have equivalent education or work experience. 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1 1 53(c)(2) (2006). While children are not directly prohibited from applying for 
employment-based immigrant visas, it is highly unlikely that they would have 
the requisite education or job experience to qualify. See 8 U.S.C.A. § I 1 53(b) 
irOT06). I·f fi d· b "I· ·bl . . . o qua I y or a ~ustment, a person must e e Igl e to receive an Immigrant 
visa" and "admissible to the United States for permanent residence. 8 U.S.c.A. 
§ 1255(a) (2006). Further, an applicant must show that "an immigrant visa is 
immediately available to him at the time his application is filed." Id. 
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United States embassy in their home country.63 While it may seem 
illogical that a person in the United States who is eligible for an 
immigrant visa must leave the country in order to reenter with that 
status, this is precisely what immigration law required in all instances 
until 1952 when adjustment of status provisions were first enacted.64 
The option to adjust status has never been available to all who would 
like to take advantage of it. It is prohibited for persons with certain 
present or past violations of immigration law such as unlawful presence, 
illegal entry, and unauthorized work.65 People who were barred from 
adjusting status faced the inconvenience of consular processing at an 
embassy abroad, but until 1996 this was largely a matter of convenience. 
Keep in mind that permitting adjustment of status simply changes where 
processing is accomplished, but "in no way relaxes the substantive 
criteria for [legal permanent resident] status.,i>6 
In 1994, Congress for the first time permitted some persons barred 
from adjustment to overcome some disqualifying violations through 
payment of a fine.67 The statutory provision which accomplished this, 
commonly referred to by its citation in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, § 245(i), permitted the adjustment of status of persons who, among 
other things, entered the country without inspection, worked without 
authorization or were unlawfully present in the United States. For 
example, pursuant to § 245(i) a person who crossed the border without 
inspection and later married a U.S. citizen could still adjust status upon 
approval of a family petition establishing the bona fides of the marriage, 
despite having entered without inspection. Section 245(i) was enacted 
with a sunset provision and was permitted to expire in 2001. It today 
remains relevant to some who benefit from grandfathering based on 
petitions filed prior to its expiration, but is not available for those who 
rely only on petitions filed after its expiration.68 
638 U.S.C.A, § l255(a) (2006). 
64 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Policy, 491 (Foundation 
Press, 4th ed. 2005). The absence of adjustment of status was the result, in large 
part, of Congress' decision until this time to vest power to issue visas 
exclusively with the Department of State, which fulfilled this function through 
consular officers posted abroad. 
~~ ~~;~~~. s~~;;~~c{~~2,0~6l91. 
678 U.S.C.A. § l255(i) (2006). 
68 In some instances, the filing of a petition that was approvable when filed prior 
to expiration may provide continuing availability of § 245(i) for subsequently 
filed petitions. 8 U.S.C.A. § l255(i) (2006); William R. Yates, U.S. Citizenship 
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In 1996, the ability to adjust status took on new importance with the 
addition of immigration law provisions barring for three years the 
reentry of people who leave the United States after remaining here 
unlawfully for more than 180 days.69 A person who remains in the 
United States unlawfully for a year or more, then leaves, is barred from 
reentry for ten years.70 These bars to reentry take effect only when a 
person departs the country, so they will not affect a person who is able to 
adjust status without leaving the country. As a result, a person who has 
been in the country unlawfully for more than a year and is married to a 
U.S. citizen cannot consular process without facing a ten year wait 
because consular processing would involve departing the United States. 
However, if persons in such situations are able to pay a fine under § 
245(i) and adjust status while in the United States, they will be able to 
obtain legal permanent residence on the basis of the marriage. 
In the absence of § 245(i) or a similar provision, the unlawful 
presence bars mean that many families that otherwise would be able to 
regularize the status of family members cannot do so without facing a 
ten year exile. Consider the common mixed status family consisting of 
an undocumented immigrant with a U.S. citizen spouse and children. 
The unavailability of adjustment of status means that achieving legal 
immigration status for the undocumented spouse would involve that 
person living outside the country for ten years. For many families, 
especially those with young children, this option is unthinkable, 
especially if the undocumented parent's income is essential to support 
the family. 
As a result, "the statutory provision meant to encourage compliance 
with the law may have encouraged the opposite: People wait in the 
United States hoping for a method of legalizing or adjusting status rather 
than leaving the United States and triggering the bar."71 When the 
prospect of years of family separation is balanced against continued 
unlawful presence in the United States, many families choose the latter. 
and Immigration Services, Interoffice Memorandum, Clarification of Certain 
Eligibility Requirements Pertaining to an Application to Adjust Status under 
Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, March 9, 2005. 
698 U.S.C.A. § 1 1 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2006). 
70 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 1 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2006). 
71 Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. 1. InCI L. & Com. Reg. 483, 
488 (2002). 
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Further, increased attention to national security means that U.S. 
border crossings have become more dangerous.72 Interior enforcement 
of immigration laws has been given a lower priority than border security, 
and the risks of being caught crossing a border exceed those of being 
removed after arrival.73 This enforcement concentration on the border 
discourages older patterns of seasonal migration and encourages a 
relatively permanent settlement pattern for undocumented immigrants. 74 
The resulting situation has particular impact on families with 
members from Mexico and Central America, as persons from these 
regions are overly represented among those who entered without 
inspection.75 As such, the facially neutral provision barring adjustment 
has a focused impact on a particular regional group.76 This, in tum, 
72 See Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces 
Expanded Border Control Plans (Aug. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3930 (last visited June 1,2005). 
73 H. G. Reza, Border Patrol Faces New Limits in Inland Empire, L.A. Times, 
Aug. 4, 2004, at Bl (reporting that "[d]ocuments and interviews show that 
Department of Homeland Security officials want to concentrate Border Patrol 
agents at the borders and limit their inland activity to arresting illegal 
immigrants while they are traveling from the border and at transportation 
centers such as Los Angeles International Airport and highway checkpoints 
such as those at Temecula and San Clemente."). 
74 Although "as much as 45% of the total unauthorized migrant population 
entered the country with visas," Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the 
Unauthorized Migrant Population at 1 (May 22, 2006), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheetsI19.pdf. ,in recent years, "on average 
97% of the overall apprehensions made by the [U.S. Border Patrol] occur along 
the U.S. border with Mexico." Congressional Research Service, Border 
Security: Apprehensions of "Other Than Mexican" Aliens, at 12, 
www.ilw.comlimrnigdaily/newsI2005.0929-CRS.pdf(Sept. 22, 2005). In Fiscal 
Year 2004,93% of persons apprehended were Mexican nationals. !d. at 1. The 
top five nationalities of "other than Mexican" persons apprehended include four 
from Central American: Honduras, EI Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Id. 
at 17 
75 Only 16% of unauthorized migrants from Mexico and 27% of unauthorized 
migrants from Central American are visa overstays. Pew Hispanic Center, 
Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population at 4 (May 22, 2006), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheetsI19.pdf. In contrast, 91 % of all other 
unauthorized migrants are visa overstays. !d. 
76 Such a result is not uncommon in the history of immigration law. The long 
lasting and targeted exclusion of Chinese from the United States was achieved, 
in part, through neutrally worded provisions such as that excluding persons 
who were "ineligible for citizenship." See Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects 
(Princeton University Press 2004). For another example, Kerry Abrams 
persuasively establishes that "the Page Law [of 1875] was not a minor statute 
targeting a narrow class of criminals, but rather an attempt to prevent Chinese 
women in general from immigrating to the United States." Kerry Abrams, 
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contributes to the fact that Mexicans constitute the largest national group 
among the undocumented population in the United States. 77 
Moreover, the technicalities of these statutes echo the broader theme 
of immigration law by devaluing the interests of children. A narrow 
waiver of the three- and ten-year bars is available to those who can prove 
that "refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in 
extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of 
such alien.,,78 In other words, the ten-year barrier to entry may be 
overcome by showing hardship to adult family members, but hardship to 
children is irrelevant. The immigration scheme here again insures that 
children's interests are not given weight and do not result in immigration 
status being extended to a family member. 
From the basic structure of family immigration to the minute details 
of procedural statutes, immigration law devalues the interests of 
children. As a result, many immigrant families find themselves 
precluded from avenues to achieve legal immigration status despite the 
citizenship and immigration status of some family members. This also 
means that many citizen children perpetually remain in mixed status 
families. As discussed more fully below, this result is intentional. And 
it is not benign. 
III. CONSEQUENCES FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 
Immigrant families face a variety of challenges and consequences 
not encountered by native households. Immigrant families are 
marginalized in some ways that exist for all immigrant families and in 
others that are reserved for families with members lacking legal 
immigration status. For many mixed status immigrant families, social 
benefits are outright denied or access to them is limited. Other families 
face concerns for family integrity which is threatened directly through 
the inability of family members to come to the United States or the 
removal of family members pursuant to immigration laws. And in 
everyday life, mixed status families face a range of challenges as they 
interact with societal institutions unsure of the implications associated 
with the array of statuses held by family members. 
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 641, 641 (2005). 
77 Passel, supra note 14 at 4 (noting 56% of unauthorized migrants are from 
Mexico). 
78 8 U.S.C.A. § I 182(a)(9)(B)(v) (2006). 
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A. FORMAL AND INFORMAL BARRIERS TO SOCIAL BENEFITS 
Decades ago in Plyler v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged "the creation of a substantial 'shadow population' of 
illegal migrants - numbering in the millions - within our borders" and 
warned that this "raises the specter of a permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a 
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our 
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents.,,79 The 
undercaste foreseen by the Court certainly exists today in the United 
States, and its numbers now include lawful residents in addition to 
undocumented immigrants. 
Over the past decade, reforms in social benefits law have introduced 
significant distinctions in the availability of public benefits between 
citizens and noncitizens, even noncitizens with legal permanent resident 
status.80 As such, the "benefits that our society makes available to 
citizens and lawful residents" referred to in the Plyler decision are now 
denied to many lawful residents.81 
Even citizens often are deprived the full social benefits of their 
citizenship when they live in immigrant households. Indeed, "most 
policies that advantage or disadvantage noncitizens are likely to have 
broad spillover effects on the citizen children who live in the great 
majority of immigrant families.,,82 Welfare reform, for example, 
"created two classes of citizen children. One class lives in households 
with noncitizens and suffers the disadvantages of losing benefits and the 
reduced overall household resources that may result; a second class of 
citizen children lives in households with only citizens and suffers no 
comparable disadvantage.,,83 When benefits to a family are prorated to 
exclude non-citizens, the whole family suffers, including citizen 
children. 
79 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982). 
80See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 110 Stat. 2105, 2269 (1996). See also Leiter et 
ai., supra note 28 at 17(noting that 1996 legal refonns "target social benefits to 
a more restricted scope of beneficiaries and citizenship status is now one of the 
screens that is used to detennine eligibility"). 
81 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 219. 
82 Fix & Zimmerman, supra note 18 at 2. 
83 [d. "Even if immigrant families did maintain food stamps for their children, 
the amount of those benefits would be lower, because the number of 'eligible' 
people in the household is now used to determine the amount of food stamps 
available." Leiter et ai., supra note 28 at 20. 
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Moreover, cItIzen children in immigrant families may not even 
receive needed benefits for which they are plainly eligible. Differences 
in immigration status within families are "problematic for children 
because 'often it is adults who claim citizenship rights for children and 
do so on their behalf and immigrant parents of citizen children may now 
find themselves in the position of requesting benefits for their children 
for which they (the parents) are not eligible.,,84 In this situation, parents 
are discouraged from seeking benefits for their children, and 
"inequalities in access within families have been created informally 
through the actions of parents and public program staff ... resulting in a 
hierarchy of citizen children's access to social benefits, which is ordered 
by their parents citizenship and immigration status.,,85 This means that 
although "citizen children of immigrant parents are formally 'insiders' 
and therefore are fully eligible for social benefits, their parents' non-
citizen, 'outsider' status may eclipse their children's citizenship, 
resulting in citizen children informally taking on their parent's 
citizenship status.,,86 Citizen children in mixed status families thus are 
assimilated to the status of undocumented children. 
As a result, and contrary to the notion that immigrants come to the 
United States seeking welfare, citizen children of immigrants access less 
public benefits than citizen children of citizens.87 For example, many 
"mixed-status families have stopped participating in food stamp 
programs overall, and one study found that use of food stamps by citizen 
children living in legal immigrant families declined 12 percent more than 
the use by citizen children living in native-born families between 1996 
and 1997.,,88 
Unsurprisingly, mixed-status families "are more likely to be poor 
than other families.,,89 For immigrants, inclusion among the poor 
generally means inclusion among the working poor. Immigrants "are 
84 Leiter et aI., supra note 28 at 17. 
85 /d. "While all citizen children have the same formal rights to social benefits, 
informally parents and street-level bureaucrats who implement public policy at 
the ground level may believe that parents' citizenship statuses eclipse children's 
individual citizenship, and may act on those beliefs." /d. at 20. 
86/d. at 17. 
87 Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, Lesson of Welfare Reform for Immigrant 
Integration, at 3 (Urban Institute March 8, 2002). "Significant declines have 
also been seen in citizen child applications from mixed-status families." Leiter 
et aI., supra note 28 at 20. 
88 Leiter et aI., supra note 28 at 20. Likewise, "a recent report stated that there 
was 'widespread perception' among undocumented parents that their citizen 
children are not eligible for Medicaid. /d. at 2l. 
89 Michael E. Fix and Wendy Zimmerman, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status 
Families in an Era of Reform, at 2 (Urban Institute 1999). 
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overrepresented among all U.S. workers but they are especially 
overrepresented among low-paid workers.,,9o Still, "[d]espite similar 
levels of work effort among their parents, children of immigrants are 
substantially more likely than children with U.S.-born parents to be poor, 
have food-related problems, live in crowded housing, lack health 
insurance, and be in fair or poor health.',9l In fact, in the United States 
"one-quarter of all children living in low-income families had one or 
more foreign-born parents.,,92 
Children in mixed-status families face other sources of insecurity. 
For example, "21 percent of all uninsured children nationwide and over 
one-half of California's uninsured children live in mixed status 
families.,,93 Children "in low-income working immigrant families were 
more than twice as likely as those in comparable native families to lack 
health insurance coverage in 2002.,,94 And children of immigrants are 
"significantly less likely to be in any regular nonparental child care 
arrangement. ,,95 
Through combinations of formal and informal denials of benefits, 
and in some cases the many challenges to earning income that attend the 
lack of legal immigration status, compared "with households with 
native-born householders, immigrant households are more likely to be 
low-income, live in poverty and be uninsured.,,96 These are real 
consequences linked to the inability of families to move through the 
immigration and naturalization system, and these outcomes are not 
fleeting. As the ability of families to regularize the immigration status of 
all family members is denied or slowed, "citizen children in these mixed 
families could exhibit less intergenerational mobility than they would 
have if their parents had been able to legalize.',97 
90 Randy Capps, Michael Fix, Everett Henderson, and Jane Reardon-Anderson, 
A Profile of Low-Income Working Immigrant Families, at 1 (Urban Institute 
June 2005). Immigrants represented 11 % of the overall popUlation, but 14% of 
workers and 20% oflow wage workers in the U.S. economy. Id. 
91/d. at 1. "Working immigrant families were about twice as likely as working 
native families to be either low-income (under 200 percent of FPL) or poor 
Mlllder 100 percent ofFPL). Id. at 2. 
Id. at 1. 
93 Id. at 2. 
94 /d. at 4. "The share of immigrant adults in low-income working families 
without health insurance is double the share of uninsured children in these 
families." Id. One study indicated that 56% "of foreign-born adults in low-
income working families were uninsured, versus 29% for comparable native-
born adults." Id. 
95 Id. at 5 ("37 percent versus 57 percent for children of natives"). 
96 Leiter et aI., supra note 28 at 12 
97 Fix & Zimmerman, supra note 18. at 5. 
HeinOnline -- 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L.  80 2006-2007
80 Virginia Journal oj Social Policy & the Law. [Vol. 14: I 
It certainly should not be at all surprising that citizen children fare 
worse when their parents are hampered in attaining immigration and 
citizenship status. In our national legal and social structures, parents are 
the foremost protectors of children and their interests.98 Marginalizing 
parents inevitably results in marginalizing children. By creating a legal 
immigration framework that stops families from achieving legal 
immigration status, the interests of children, including citizen children, 
are compromised in significant and lasting ways. 
B. DE FACTO DEPORTATION 
For many citizen children, living without the full social benefits of 
citizenship with an intact mixed status family is preferable to at least 
some of the alternatives. Parents who are not able to regularize their 
immigration status are subject to removal from the United States, even 
when they play a crucial role in the support and nurture of citizen 
children. When formal removal of parents happens, children either 
remain in the United States separated from their parents or accompany 
parents abroad through so-called de facto deportation.99 One outcome 
denies citizen children their right to remain in the United States, and the 
other destroys their right to live in an intact family. 
Courts across the country have consistently rejected a possible a 
third outcome, turning away a variety of constitutional claims that a 
child's immigration and citizenship rights prohibit the parents' 
removal. 100 Children's valid immigration status or citizenship status 
98 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that it is "cardinal 
... that the custody, care and nurture of the child resides first in the parents"). 
99 The child "as an American citizen, has an uncontested legal right to remain in 
this country, if the order [to deport parents] is enforced he must either suffer to 
be separated from his natural parents (an unlikely event in view of his tender 
years) or leave with them-- in violation, it is contended, of his constitutional 
rights, privileges and immunities. In practical terms, the impact of the order 
expends its force as much upon the infant as upon the parents." Application of 
Amoury, 307 F.Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
100 See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 6 Nev. L.J. 1165, 1195 (2006). See also, Enciso-Cardozo v. 
INS, 504 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1974); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 
1977); Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1986); Gonzalez-
Cuevas v. INS, 515 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1975); Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 
343 (6th Cir. 1984); Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965), 
disapproved on other grounds sub nom. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 
(1968); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978); de Robles v. 
INS, 485 F.2d 100 (lOth Cir. 1973). The First and District of Columbia Circuits 
rejected similar claims made by spouses. Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 
(l970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1st Cir. 1971); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 
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alone is not sufficient to overcome the removal of a parent from the 
United States. 101 In analyzing such claims, courts have relied heavily on 
the notion that citizen children who leave the country with deported 
parents have a right to return when they reach adulthood. 102 
Removal from the United States implicates "issues basic to human 
liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which 
aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself.,,103 In some instances, 
removal "may result in the loss of all that makes life worth living.,,104 
While not every decision to remove children from the United States will 
result in hardship, the possibility of deprivation and harm often will be 
present. Further, despite a right to return, removal of citizen children 
from the United States is certain to limit their development of important 
bonds with their country of citizenship. In some instances, even the 
possibility of removal can have tremendous impact on a family'S 
approach to life in the United States. 
C. DAILY CONTRADICTIONS 
Undocumented immigrants and mixed status families face a rash of 
contradictory messages and consequences as they interact with a society 
that does not legally sanction their presence. Individuals and institutions 
338 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Seventh Circuit has rejected similar arguments raised 
in slightly different contexts. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (1th 
Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that would in effect "allow deportable aliens ... 
to attach derivatively to the right of their citizen children to remain in the United 
States. "). 
101 Thronson, supra, note 100, at 1195. 
I02Acosta, 558 F.2d at 1158 (noting that upon reaching adulthood "as an 
American citizen she may then, if she so chooses, return to the United States to 
live"). See also Newton, 736 F.2d at 343 ("Newton children will remain 
American citizens who have the right to return to this country at any time of 
their liking"); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[O]nce 
she reaches the age of discretion, [she] will be able to decide for herself where 
she will live, and at that time, she will be free to return and make her home in 
this country."). 
103 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). The interest in 
remaining in the United States is, "without question, a weighty one. She stands 
to lose the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.'" Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154). Removal 
is "always a harsh measure." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449. Indeed, it is 
"a sanction which in severity surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal 
penalties." Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977); see also United States 
ex reI. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630,630 (2d Cir. 1926) ("However heinous his 
crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the 
common consent of all civilized peoples."). 
104 Bridges, at 326 U.S., at 47 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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struggle to respond in their interactions with persons who are not 
authorized to be present, but who have genuine legal and moral claims 
that in many instances transcend their immigration status. One example 
of this struggle is found in the nation's family courts. 
Unfortunately, as immigrant families become more integrated into 
life in the United States, they tend to develop an "alI-too-American 
pattern of immigrant family disintegration.,,105 When immigrants and 
mixed status families arrive at family courts, immigration related issues 
come with them. Given the rise of mixed status families in the United 
States, it is very common that all the parties in family court proceedings 
do not share a common citizenship or immigration status. In such 
instances, parties routinely seek to exploit differences in immigration 
status, and some family courts readily acquiesce. 106 Even where 
discriminatory requests are rebuffed, immigration status issues present 
family courts with puzzling questions as they attempt to distinguish fact 
from stereotype in understanding the complications of living in the 
United States without legal immigration status. I07 
By stopping families short of achieving a common immigration or 
citizenship status, immigration law complicates the daily lives of 
immigrant families. The everyday implications of having family 
members without legal immigration status are felt daily in courts, 
schools, workplaces, departments of motor vehicles, and other societal 
institutions. This also certainly impacts family dynamics and the lives 
of children in immigrant families. 
IV. VALUING CHILDREN'S INTERESTS IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
The asymmetry in the value placed upon the interests of children and 
those of parents in immigration law is closely linked with concern about 
creating incentives for undocumented immigrants to have children in the 
United States. The citizenship concept of jus soli, the right of the land, 
extends U.S. citizenship to children born in the United States.108 The 
Fourteenth Amendment states that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
105 Michael F. Fix, et al. supra note 12 at 20. 
106 David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the 
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in u.s. Family Courts, 11 Tex. Hisp. 
lL. & Pol'y. 45, 56-63 (2005). 
107 Id. at 72-75. 
108 Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the 
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 Am. J. Compo L. 511, 516 (1995) (noting that the age 
requirement to sponsor a parent "is attributable to jus soli citizenship law"). 
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the United States and of the State wherein they reside."I09 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this to mean that, with a few delineated exceptions, 
all children born in the United States are U.S. citizens at birth, regardless 
of the immigration status of their parents. I IO 
Proposals for either statutory reform or constitutional amendment to 
limit the application of the jus soli principle in order to restrict the 
acquisition of citizenship by the children of undocumented immigrants 
are often advanced, but none have gained sufficient support to have any 
realistic chance of enactment. 111 Even in the unlikely event that such a 
proposal were to take effect, it would operate only prospectively for 
future generations. 112 As a practical matter then, jus soli citizenship and 
mixed status families are with us well into the foreseeable future. The 
policies that have been adopted in reaction to jus soli citizenship, 
however, warrant immediate review. 
The great fear is that "[w]ithout a minimum age [for petitioning], an 
undocumented alien could cross the border, give birth in the United 
109 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This mandate is incorporated into statute at 8 
U.S.c. § 1401. 
110 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), held that Native Americans born within 
the United States but within tribal authority were not "subject to the 
jurisdiction" of the United States and thus did not acquire U.S. citizenship at 
birth. Citizenship at birth is now conferred to affected Native Americans by 
statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b). The Court later clarified that the only other 
persons falling outside the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause are "children born 
of enemy aliens in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives 
of a foreign state." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682 (1898). 
F or a view questioning whether jus soli citizenship is constitutionally mandated, 
see Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). 
111 "Advocates of such a change emphasize the importance of mutual consent--
the polity's as well as the alien's--in legitimizing American citizenship. They 
also point to the irrationality of permitting a Mexican woman with no claims on 
the United States to be able to confer American citizenship on her new child 
simply by crossing the border and giving birth, perhaps at public expense, in an 
American hospital. Defenders of birthright citizenship stress the importance of 
avoiding the creation and perpetuation of an underclass of long-term residents 
who do not qualify as citizens, a condition similar to that of many guestworkers 
and their descendants stranded in countries that reject the jus soli principle." 
Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 Geo. Immigr. 
LJ. 1,20 (1997). 
112 "United States citizenship, once acquired, is virtually impossible to lose 
without the Citizen's express consent. Supreme Court decisions since the 1960s 
have severely restricted the government's power to denationalize a citizen for 
reasons of disloyalty, divided allegiance, or otherwise. Today, the government 
cannot prevail against a birthright or jus sanguinis citizen unless it can prove 
that the citizen specifically intended to renounce his or her citizenship." !d. at 
11-12. 
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States and immediately have the newborn child file a petition for his or 
her parents to immigrate.,,!!3 By denying agency in immigration law to 
children, it is thought, "a woman who is otherwise a deportable alien 
does not have any incentive to bear a child (who automatically becomes 
a citizen) whose rights to stay are separate from the mother's obligation 
to depart.,,!!4 Yet the devaluation of children's interests found in 
immigration law and the automatic ability of parents to qualify for 
immigration status are hardly the only conceivable responses to the 
reality of jus soli citizenship. 
There is little reason, moreover, to believe that stripping children of 
agency in the immigration law actually is an effective deterrent on the 
birthrates in immigrant families. Parents choose to have children for 
numerous reasons other than gaining favor in the immigration system. 
Despite the challenges facing mixed status families, they continue to 
grow in number. Certainly, the effectiveness of creating barriers to 
families regularizing their immigration status is not evident in a 
reduction in the size of the undocumented population. Rather, what is 
evident are the effects of devaluing children and creating barriers to 
families regularizing their immigration status, as demonstrated in the 
challenging conditions and insecurities under which mixed status 
families live. The brunt of these effects is felt by children. 
Aside from considerations of fairness in a system where children pay 
the cost of their parents' actions, the willingness to trade the present and 
future of citizen children for an alleged deterrent on unauthorized 
immigration is shortsighted at best. In particular, if children are to have 
a productive future in the United States, they should not be handicapped 
from the start. But the nation's current formal and informal barriers to 
the social benefits of citizenship for children in mixed status families 
create conditions in which such children, citizen and noncitizen alike, 
routinely are assimilated to the status of undocumented immigrants. If 
we wish children to succeed as adults, it makes little sense to force them 
to start life at a disadvantage by imposing barriers to full social 
citizenship. It makes even less sense to see citizen children leave with 
deported parents only to return as adults who are unaccustomed and 
unacculturated to life in this country. 
113 Motomura, supra note 106, at 516. 
114 Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618. See also Faustino v. INS, 302 F.Supp. 212, 215-16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), ajJ'd 432 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 921 
(1970) (providing an appendix of Senate hearings transcripts that discuss desire 
to draft immigration provisions to avoid extending immediate admission to 
parents on the basis of the birth of child in the United States). 
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The irony of current immigration law is that citizen children, when 
they cease to be children, are permitted to sponsor their parents for 
immigration status. In other words, immigration law fully contemplates 
the parents of citizen children as legal residents, but only after a 21 year 
moratorium encompassing the most developmentally critical periods of 
the children's lives. Assuming a need to penalize parents for arriving in 
the United States without proper authorization, there must be an 
appropriate penalty that does not simultaneously punish a citizen child 
for 21 years. More pointedly, any immigration reform debate that 
discusses only the desire not to reward particular behaviors of parents 
without consideration of the resulting punishment of children is 
incomplete. 
Of course, parents of citizen children need not be granted automatic 
and immediate immigration status. But as the nation seriously considers 
extending legal status to undocumented workers based, in part, on the 
equity that they have established through years of contributions in the 
country's workplaces, it is not be unthinkable that family ties in the 
United States similarly give rise to equitable considerations. Such 
considerations would serve to make to make immigration reform more 
forward looking rather than backward looking. Recognition of parents' 
role in nurturing and supporting their children in this country can serve 
as a principled reason not to enhance but rather to reduce immigration 
barriers for family members who are likely to ultimately be admitted to 
legal status anyway. In other words, rather than saving some of its 
toughest sanctions for families already living here with close and lasting 
ties to this country, immigration law must find ways to value those ties 
within the framework of immigration laws by empowering children and 
acknowledging their importance in families. 
Despite immigration law, children are a central organizing force for 
many families. Any "assumption that children's immigration status 
must derive from that of their parents rather than vice versa recalls an 
earlier set of gendered assumptions - that women traveled with or 
followed their husbands, but not vice versa.,,115 For example, it was only 
with the 1922 Cable Act that "marriage to an alien no longer stripped a 
woman of her citizenship automatically." I 16 Just as it once was deemed 
115 Jacqueline Bhabha, The "Mere Fortuity" of Birth? Are Children Citizens?, 
15(2) Differences 91,96 (2004). 
116 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 464 (1988). A woman "still lost her United 
States citizenship if she married an alien ineligible for citizenship; she could not 
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natural that a woman's immigration and citizenship status followed that 
of their husband,ll7 the "one-way descending flow of familial 
transmission of citizenship, from parent to child rather than from child to 
parent, is accepted as a natural rather than a constructed asymmetry." I 18 
The restriction on children serving as the source of immigration status is 
no more natural than the restriction on women so serving was. 
Immigration and citizenship law have evolved past the narrow and 
constructed view of women as objects, and it is time that the same is 
accomplished for children. 
Outside the realm of immigration law, the primacy of children's 
interests in family decisions is now deeply entrenched. At times, this is 
the result of children actively participating in and influencing family 
decisions. Yet even if we characterize parents as making important 
family decisions, this merely obscures the fact that when parents make 
such decisions they frequently are giving effect to children's rights and 
interests. When family courts are involved in decisions about children, 
the interests of children are certain to be the central factor. 119 Similar 
recognition of the interests and rights of children in immigration law is 
long overdue. Through such recognition, immigrant families may find a 
path from here to here. 
become a citizen by naturalization if her husband did not qualify for citizenship; 
she was presumed to have renounced her citizenship if she lived abroad in her 
husband's country for for two years, or if she lived abroad elsewhere for five 
years. !d. Moreover, a "woman who became a naturalized citizen was unable 
to transmit her citizenship to her children if her noncitizen husband remained 
alive and they were not separated." Id. This rule remained in effect until 1934. 
!d. . 
117 Indeed, not all that long ago, the notion of women with agency seemed a 
radical idea. See Lucy S. McGough, Families in the 21st Century: Changing 
Dynamics, Institutions, and Policies, Introduction: The Past as Prologue, 54 
Emory L.J. 1219, 1220 (2005) (noting that a century ago the Yale Law Journal 
included an article entitled "Are Women People"). 
118 !d. at 99. . 
119 "The custody law in every state in the United States ... embraces the 'best 
interest' standard." D. Marianne Blair & Merle H. Weiner, Resolving Parental 
Custody Disputes - A Comparative Exploration, 39 Fam. L.Q. 2, 247 (Summer 
2005). 
